NetPlay save synchronization decoded remote LZO blocks with the unsafe
decoder and no output capacity. A malicious host could overflow a client
buffer with a block larger than its declared size.
Use the bounds-checking decoder, validate the declared output length, and
grow buffer results only after each checked block has been decoded.
A malicious dol could theoretically use integer wraparound to bypass
bounds checking and cause DolReader to read past the end of m_bytes.
Could result in crashes, wasting large amounts of memory, or even the
disclosure of heap memory contents.
A malicious GCZ file could probably force this to be negative.
Shouldn't cause any issues other than file read failures, but need to fix
because it is causing errors on MSVC.
SectorReader::ReadChunk does do some validation on it, but it only
checks against the original disc size (reported by the GCZ file).
It has no idea how many blocks the header claimed the disc had.
A maliciously crafted GCZ file could trigger read overflows off the end
of the m_block_pointers/m_hashes arrays.
This change was causing some issues:
> Made FMT_STRING a no-op when FMT_USE_CONSTEVAL is enabled, since the consteval format-string constructor already provides compile-time validation (#4611, #4612). Thanks @friedkeenan.
We had some code in VolumeVerifier to catch the error message that
Redump.org used to show when trying to access the Wii datfile without
logging in. This restriction was removed from Redump.org around the
start of 2022, and the code has been unnecessary ever since.
When we added the RetroAchievements integration, we had a discussion
about whether sending version information in the user agent was fine
from a privacy standpoint. We reached the conclusion that it was okay,
but it was conditional on the website having a privacy policy. Neither
incarnation of Redump has that, and Redump also never asked us to send
version information like RetroAchievements did, so let's use a user
agent that just says "Dolphin" when connecting to Redump.
All the staff of Redump (except the absentee sysadmin) have decided to
start a new version of the website at redump.info. It has every disc
from the old site, it has HTTPS, it isn't buckling under the load of AI
scrapers, and moving forward, all adding and verifying of discs is going
to be happening on the new website only. Let's move over.
I've taken the unusual step of updating the translation files manually.
This is because we're very close to a release and because the change is
simple enough that I feel confident about making the change to languages
I don't speak. (I double checked that the Korean translation doesn't
ever follow "Redump.org" by a particle that has a different form
depending on whether there's a final consonant.)
This makes us savestate the NAND using the same APIs the guest uses
instead of directly touching the host files. This solves several
problems:
* If the user loaded a malicious savestate, it could use path traversal
to overwrite arbitrary files on the host file system. (Reported by
MrSynAckster.)
* Metadata (UID, GID, attribute, modes) wasn't being savestated.
* NAND redirects weren't handled, except for NAND redirects at the root
of where the savestate was being done. (This only possibly matters if
TASing a Riivolution patch. The root of the savestate is at /tmp when
not TASing, and the only case where we do a NAND redirect is inside
/title if requested by a Riivolution patch.)
