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Cockatrice/tests/password_hash_test.cpp
BruebachL a139084ad6
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[Security] Add challenge-response auth with scrypt verifiers and stop storing plaintext passwords (#7193)
* [Security] Add challenge-response auth with scrypt verifiers and stop storing plaintext passwords

Challenge-response authentication: the client derives a scrypt verifier
(RFC 7914, EVP_PBE_scrypt, N=32768, r=8, p=1) and authenticates with
HMAC-SHA256(key, nonce), so neither the password nor its hash is
transmitted. The stored format becomes
"$scrypt$<n>$<r>$<p>$<salt>$<verifier>" and Response_PasswordSalt
now carries the cost parameters. Strict servers only accept scrypt
verifiers; legacy accounts are migrated after a successful login.

Fix #344 for challenge-response servers: a saved profile stores the
derived verifier under the password key instead of the plaintext password.
The connect dialog loads it without revealing it, autoconnect passes it
through, the change-password dialog no longer prefills the old password
field with it, and the client only persists the verifier when
"Save password" is checked.

Took 3 minutes

Took 1 minute

Took 10 seconds

Took 7 minutes

* [Security] Harden credential format acceptance and challenge nonce validation

* [Security] Refuse KDF downgrade; trim profile name and warn on silent credential drop

* [Security] Add SupportsAll ServerOptions enumerator to fix enum validation assert

The server advertised both SupportsPasswordHash (1) and
SupportsChallengeResponseAuth (2) via a bitwise-OR that produced the
value 3, which no enumerator declared. Protobuf's proto2 enum
validation rejects the value in _internal_set_server_options, crashing
servatrice on the debug assertion. Add a SupportsAll = 3 enumerator with
an identical wire value so the bitmask reads unchanged while the value
is now a documented, valid member of the enum.

* [Security] Normalize username when issuing challenge nonce

cmdRequestPasswordSalt bound the challenge nonce to the raw, un-simplified
username while cmdLogin verifies it against the simplified name. A user
who typed leading or trailing whitespace in the username box would be
silently rejected during challenge-response login even with the correct
password. Simplify at the nonce-issuing site so both commands agree on
the normalized name.

Also drive-by formatting: collapse the now single-expression
serverOptions initializer onto one line.

* [Security] Keep an encrypted legacy password backup for old-client logins

Migrating an account to scrypt stranded pre-challenge clients, which can
only present the legacy salt+hash: after migration the server served them
a scrypt salt they cannot use, so the only recovery was a password reset.

When security/legacy_backup_key is configured (64 hex chars,
openssl rand -hex 32), submitPasswordVerifier now seals the legacy
credential with AES-256-GCM under that key before overwriting the row,
storing it in password_legacy_backup with the time it was last used. Old
clients keep working: cmdRequestPasswordSalt serves the backup's 16-char
salt in password_salt so they can derive the legacy hash they were
always able to compute, while new clients derive the verifier from the
new scrypt_salt field, which always carries the verifier salt. The
non-challenge login path accepts the plaintext or legacy hash against
the decrypted backup and refreshes its window; a migrated row with no
usable backup fails closed.

Backups age out so a database dump taken after the window closes never
carries a crackable legacy hash: getUsableLegacyBackup purges on first
use past security/legacy_backup_ttl_days (default 90, clamped 1..3650),
and a six-hourly sweep drops backups idle accounts never touch.
changeUserPassword clears the backup since a new credential invalidates
it. Without a configured key nothing is sealed or purged, so a
temporarily missing key cannot destroy existing backups.

The AAD is the simplified user name on both sides, sealing the blob to
its row so it cannot be moved between accounts. Sealing failures
degrade to the previous lockout behaviour rather than blocking
migration. The columns extend the unmerged 0036->0037 migration, so the
schema version stays 37.

* [Security] Address review: proto compat, plaintext verify, AAD case, strict scope

Fix the two blockers and follow-ups from the 2026-10-16 review:

- Advertise challenge-response in a new supports_challenge_response
  field instead of the ServerOptions enum and drop SupportsAll:
  proto2 enums are closed, so already-released clients parsed
  server_options = 3 as NoOptions and fell back to plaintext
  passwords. server_options stays exactly SupportsPasswordHash
  on the wire; old clients ignore the new field.
- Verify a plaintext password directly against a migrated scrypt
  row with verifyPassword() so email changes (cmdAccountEdit)
  and old clients sending password keep working without a
  legacy backup key. Pre-hashed values are still checked
  against the backup, and its TTL window is refreshed only
  when the backup is what actually matched.
- Use the stored row name as the AES-GCM AAD on both seal
  and open so a login whose case differs from the stored
  name (utf8mb4_unicode_ci) still opens its backup.
- Require challenge-response in strict mode only for
  registered SQL accounts (userExists gate), leaving
  guest/unregistered logins and none/password auth
  methods unaffected.
- Document in servatrice.ini.example that a captured
  legacy hash can take over a not-yet-migrated account
  and that strict only constrains registered SQL
  accounts. Schema version is 38.

* [Security] Raise legacy backup TTL default to 180 days

Gives operators and slow-to-upgrade users a longer downgrade
window for pre-challenge clients before unused encrypted
legacy password backups age out.

* [Security] Fix servatrice.cpp formatting per clang-format-18

* [Security] Add missing forward declaration for Command_SubmitPasswordVerifier

The cmdSubmitPasswordVerifier declaration references the proto-generated
type, which otherwise does not name a type in this header and breaks
every C++ build.

---------

Co-authored-by: Lukas Brübach <Bruebach.Lukas@bdosecurity.de>
Co-authored-by: BruebachL <bruebachl@cockatrice.example>
2026-10-16 22:52:26 +02:00

249 lines
10 KiB
C++

#include "gtest/gtest.h"
#include <QChar>
#include <QString>
#include <QStringList>
#include <cstring>
#include <libcockatrice/utility/cryptoutil.h>
#include <libcockatrice/utility/passwordhasher.h>
#include <string>
namespace
{
TEST(PasswordHashTest, RegressionTest)
{
QString salt = "saltsaltsaltsalt";
QString password = "password";
QString expected = "vmKoWv975yf+WT2QCXhW48JNzZ2ghGxdgNvuKLBU0h7s6AQHSG72J6QO4ZswuSeqvBbAXbmgJSRBaSJrgc55WA==";
QString hash = PasswordHasher::computeHash(password, salt);
ASSERT_EQ(hash, salt + expected) << "The computed hash value remains the same";
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, SaltUsesAlphanumericCharset)
{
static const char alphanum[] = "0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
const QString salt = PasswordHasher::generateRandomSalt();
ASSERT_EQ(salt.size(), 16);
for (const QChar &c : salt) {
ASSERT_NE(strchr(alphanum, c.toLatin1()), nullptr);
}
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, SaltsAreUnique)
{
const QString salt1 = PasswordHasher::generateRandomSalt();
const QString salt2 = PasswordHasher::generateRandomSalt();
ASSERT_NE(salt1, salt2);
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, TokenHasExpectedLength)
{
const QString token = PasswordHasher::generateActivationToken();
ASSERT_EQ(token.size(), 16);
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, DeriveKeyMatchesKnownVector)
{
// RFC 7914 scrypt test vector, P="password", S="NaCl", N=1024, r=8, p=16
const QByteArray expected = QByteArray::fromHex("fdbabe1c9d3472007856e7190d01e9fe7c6ad7cbc8237830e77376634b"
"3731622eaf30d92e22a3886ff109279d9830dac727afb94a83ee6d8360cb"
"dfa2cc0640");
const QByteArray derived = PasswordHasher::deriveKey("password", QByteArray("NaCl"), 1024, 8, 16);
ASSERT_EQ(derived.toHex(), expected.toHex());
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, PasswordVerifierRoundTrip)
{
const QString stored = PasswordHasher::generatePasswordVerifier("hunter2");
ASSERT_FALSE(stored.isEmpty());
ASSERT_TRUE(stored.startsWith("$scrypt$"));
const PasswordVerifier parsed = PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(stored);
ASSERT_TRUE(parsed.isValid);
ASSERT_EQ(parsed.format, PasswordFormat::Scrypt);
ASSERT_EQ(parsed.n, SCRYPT_N);
ASSERT_EQ(parsed.r, SCRYPT_R);
ASSERT_EQ(parsed.p, SCRYPT_P);
ASSERT_EQ(parsed.salt.size(), SCRYPT_SALT_LENGTH);
ASSERT_EQ(parsed.verifier.size(), SCRYPT_VERIFIER_LENGTH);
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, PasswordVerifierInvalidInput)
{
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier("garbage").isValid);
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier("$scrypt$not-an-int$8$1$AAAA$BBBB").isValid);
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier("$scrypt$1024$8$1$AAAA$too-short").isValid);
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier("$pbkdf2-sha512$1000$AAAA$BBBB").isValid);
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, LegacyFormatDetection)
{
ASSERT_TRUE(PasswordHasher::isLegacyFormat("salt+hash"));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::isLegacyFormat(PasswordHasher::generatePasswordVerifier("password")));
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, DeriveKeyDependsOnCostParameters)
{
const QByteArray keyA = PasswordHasher::deriveKey("password", QByteArray("NaCl"), 1024, 8, 16);
const QByteArray keyB = PasswordHasher::deriveKey("password", QByteArray("NaCl"), 2048, 8, 16);
const QByteArray keyC = PasswordHasher::deriveKey("password", QByteArray("NaCl"), 1024, 8, 1);
ASSERT_NE(keyA, keyB);
ASSERT_NE(keyA, keyC);
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, ComputeResponseIsDeterministic)
{
const QByteArray nonce = QByteArray("a nonce value");
const QByteArray key = QByteArray("the verifier bytes");
const QByteArray r1 = PasswordHasher::computeResponse(key, nonce);
const QByteArray r2 = PasswordHasher::computeResponse(key, nonce);
const QByteArray r3 = PasswordHasher::computeResponse(QByteArray("a different key"), nonce);
ASSERT_EQ(r1, r2);
ASSERT_NE(r1, r3);
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, ConstantTimeEquals)
{
ASSERT_TRUE(PasswordHasher::constantTimeEquals(QByteArray("same"), QByteArray("same")));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::constantTimeEquals(QByteArray("same"), QByteArray("diff")));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::constantTimeEquals(QByteArray("short"), QByteArray("longer")));
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, CostParamsAreSane)
{
// Accept the recommended interactive parameters and the RFC 7914 test vector's.
ASSERT_TRUE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(SCRYPT_N, SCRYPT_R, SCRYPT_P));
ASSERT_TRUE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(1024, 8, 16));
// n must be in [1024, 2**20] and a power of two.
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(512, 8, 1));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(1 << 21, 8, 1));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(1025, 8, 1));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(0, 8, 1));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(-1024, 8, 1));
// r in [1, 32], p in [1, 16].
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(1024, 0, 1));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(1024, 33, 1));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(1024, 8, 0));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(1024, 8, 17));
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, ParsePasswordVerifierRejectsHostileCostParams)
{
// 16 bytes of salt and 64 bytes of verifier, base64 encoded.
const QString saltB64 = QLatin1String("c2FsdHNhbHRzYWx0c2FsdA==");
const QString verifierB64 = QString(QByteArray(SCRYPT_VERIFIER_LENGTH, '\x42').toBase64());
ASSERT_TRUE(
PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(QString("$scrypt$1024$8$1$%1$%2").arg(saltB64).arg(verifierB64)).isValid);
// n not a power of two, below 1024, or above 2**20.
ASSERT_FALSE(
PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(QString("$scrypt$1025$8$1$%1$%2").arg(saltB64).arg(verifierB64)).isValid);
ASSERT_FALSE(
PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(QString("$scrypt$512$8$1$%1$%2").arg(saltB64).arg(verifierB64)).isValid);
ASSERT_FALSE(
PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(QString("$scrypt$1073741824$8$1$%1$%2").arg(saltB64).arg(verifierB64))
.isValid);
// r and p out of range.
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(QString("$scrypt$1024$33$1$%1$%2").arg(saltB64).arg(verifierB64))
.isValid);
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(QString("$scrypt$1024$8$17$%1$%2").arg(saltB64).arg(verifierB64))
.isValid);
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, VerifyPasswordLegacyRow)
{
const QString salt = PasswordHasher::generateRandomSalt();
const QString legacyStored = PasswordHasher::computeHash("correct horse", salt);
ASSERT_TRUE(PasswordHasher::verifyPassword("correct horse", legacyStored));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::verifyPassword("battery staple", legacyStored));
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, VerifyPasswordScryptRow)
{
const QString scryptStored = PasswordHasher::generatePasswordVerifier("correct horse");
// Regression for the changeUserPassword bug that re-hashed the old password with
// a 16-char salt torn out of the "$scrypt$..." string, which could never match.
ASSERT_TRUE(PasswordHasher::verifyPassword("correct horse", scryptStored));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::verifyPassword("battery staple", scryptStored));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::verifyPassword("correct horse", "garbage"));
}
TEST(CryptoUtilTest, SecretRoundTrip)
{
const QByteArray key = CryptoUtil::randomBytes(32);
const QByteArray plaintext = PasswordHasher::computeHash("correct horse", "saltsaltsaltsalt").toUtf8();
const QByteArray aad = "alice";
const QString sealed = CryptoUtil::encryptSecret(plaintext, key, aad);
ASSERT_FALSE(sealed.isEmpty());
ASSERT_TRUE(sealed.startsWith("enc1:"));
ASSERT_EQ(CryptoUtil::decryptSecret(sealed, key, aad), plaintext);
}
TEST(CryptoUtilTest, SealIsNonDeterministic)
{
const QByteArray key = CryptoUtil::randomBytes(32);
const QByteArray plaintext = "same secret";
// Fresh random nonce per seal: identical inputs must not produce identical blobs.
ASSERT_NE(CryptoUtil::encryptSecret(plaintext, key), CryptoUtil::encryptSecret(plaintext, key));
}
TEST(CryptoUtilTest, RejectsWrongKey)
{
const QByteArray key = CryptoUtil::randomBytes(32);
const QByteArray otherKey = CryptoUtil::randomBytes(32);
const QString sealed = CryptoUtil::encryptSecret("secret", key, "alice");
ASSERT_FALSE(sealed.isEmpty());
ASSERT_TRUE(CryptoUtil::decryptSecret(sealed, otherKey, "alice").isEmpty());
}
TEST(CryptoUtilTest, RejectsWrongAad)
{
const QByteArray key = CryptoUtil::randomBytes(32);
const QString sealed = CryptoUtil::encryptSecret("secret", key, "alice");
ASSERT_FALSE(sealed.isEmpty());
ASSERT_TRUE(CryptoUtil::decryptSecret(sealed, key, "bob").isEmpty());
ASSERT_TRUE(CryptoUtil::decryptSecret(sealed, key).isEmpty());
}
TEST(CryptoUtilTest, RejectsTampering)
{
const QByteArray key = CryptoUtil::randomBytes(32);
const QString sealed = CryptoUtil::encryptSecret("secret", key);
ASSERT_FALSE(sealed.isEmpty());
// Flip a character inside the ciphertext segment (keep it valid base64).
QStringList parts = sealed.split(':');
ASSERT_EQ(parts.size(), 3);
QByteArray ciphertext = QByteArray::fromBase64(parts.at(2).toUtf8());
ciphertext[0] = static_cast<char>(ciphertext.at(0) ^ 0x01);
parts[2] = QString(ciphertext.toBase64());
ASSERT_TRUE(CryptoUtil::decryptSecret(parts.join(':'), key).isEmpty());
}
TEST(CryptoUtilTest, RejectsMalformedInput)
{
const QByteArray key = CryptoUtil::randomBytes(32);
ASSERT_TRUE(CryptoUtil::decryptSecret("garbage", key).isEmpty());
ASSERT_TRUE(CryptoUtil::decryptSecret("enc1:notbase64!!:also-not!", key).isEmpty());
ASSERT_TRUE(CryptoUtil::decryptSecret("enc1:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA:AAAA", key).isEmpty());
ASSERT_TRUE(CryptoUtil::decryptSecret("", key).isEmpty());
// A short or oversized key must never reach the cipher.
ASSERT_TRUE(
CryptoUtil::decryptSecret("enc1:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA", CryptoUtil::randomBytes(16))
.isEmpty());
ASSERT_TRUE(CryptoUtil::encryptSecret("secret", CryptoUtil::randomBytes(16)).isEmpty());
}
} // namespace
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
}